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The tremors felt after the collapse of socialism and the nscenl of oa-
uonahsm have dramaticalty shaken the end nr the twentie th century. Al-
though it hm. been said th<~t nobody couJd have predicted such a course 
of events, there were nevertheless many portents indicating that sociaJism 
had not been able to find a viahlc rurm of pulitie<tl ·urvival or a work-
able;: ~conomic onra.nizatiun. h thu failed m two fundamental areas which 
L·on.,titute modem~ age: it did not manage to protect political righLc; of in-
dividuals which had. since F1ench re\'olution, been the axis of modem po-
litical structurclo. am.! it did not manage to o rganize efficient production 
and it" consmnt innovation. 
First, the early predictions o f the collap. e of "odalism will be ana-
Jyz.ctl (I). Second, 1 he lingering elementS in modem history of thought 
which nationalism relies upon will be pointed out (2). And finally, we are 
going to focus on its innuencc on the constitution of the Croatian politi-
cal l-.)'S le m (3). 
I. 
1\moag the major early insights into the unlenahiliLy nf the power ~:ys­
rem on which the entire polilic<ll .,lruclllrc of the Eastern bloc rested was 
Hannah Arendt's theory about the difference between power (Macht) and 
might (Gcwalt). ln one letter from 1964 she outlined this difference which 
underlined a ll her later thinking: '·Generally speaking, might aJways stems 
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(rom wcakne1 s. It is the Ia t r~son of those wbo hav~ no a ulholity (no 
consent or support of tbe people) to find a su bstitute. !'his hope. in my 
opinion. is futile. Due: to the same reason it i dangerous to measure a 
counrry' might by it!. arsenal of coercion. That the excess of might n:prt!-
scms one of the greatest dang-~r- for Lhe power of a community, partic.:u-
lnrly of a republic, is one of the o ldest truths of pulit icaJ science··.t The 
contemporary politi~tl sciGnce, aL'Cnrding to Hannah Arendt, does not rec-
ognize the fundamental facts of life, '\nch al> power, potency, strength, 
cnJthurrty, which n.: lute to various nspects of life. The participants iJ1 politi-
ca l life, in tlccordance with the dominant categozy of authority in the un-
de r-;tnn<.Ung of the political, fall into two completely Llifferent groups: the 
rulers and the ruled, the uperiors and the inferiors. This very divh.iun of 
the political body, accentuated hy the umcept of the sovereignty and the 
o., tale, docs not distinguish between the power nnd the mighL Hannah Ar-
endt further elabor:tl~'> on this di tinction in many vanatioos. Thi io., hn\\ 
'>he: defines these conceptS: '·Power means <J hurnun capacity which does 
not solely induuc acting and doing, but acting in a community and com-
municating \vith others. Power i' ncvt:r an individual capacity: it is alwaY'> 
a property of a group and exists only a · long m. a group sticks together. 
\Vhcn we l.ay tlmt somebody ·' has pow~r" ir really means that they have 
been authorized hy a u:rtai:u number of people to act in their name. At 
the moment when the group which ha · enahlcd the power-wielder to rise 
tu power ;mt.l which has endowed Lhem with that power d ishnnd:-., their 
power also expires".2 
Urtlike energy or strength, power is not mat erial or in5lrumentnl, it 
does not lend it.;clf to rneasutement or storage. Power exists only in the 
realm of human cohesion from whence it can nlely ensue. "t\s a matte r 
of facl, power belongs to the essence of a state community, Ln all o rgan-
ized gToups: might does not. Power hy its nature is ins trumental. Like all 
means and tools it also requires a purpose which directs and justifies its 
u.,c·'.3 That is wby power is not vested in a monarch, let altme in an un-
scrupulous rule r, hut unly in people, o r more precisely, in the suppon uf 
the entire political body. Hannah rench is diametrically opposed to tb~ 
tht:l>i' that power presupposes might: on rhe contrury, might destroys 
power. According to Arendt, a command coming out of a gun barre l ~ 
always effective but never results in power. From thi~ shc concludes that 
the system of coercion, . udt as c.ommunism was, cannot hold out: "Where 
might is confronted with might, the might of tbt: srate always prevails. 
However, this absolute power lasts onJy as long tts th t: · structure nf power 
remains intact, tts long as t:ommands are obeyed and the police and thl! 
I Eli.sabelh Yuog- Bruehl, Honoah Ar<Wdt, Lc!ben und Wcr.k, S. Fischer 
Verlag, Franl..1'uri/M., 19H2, p. SM. 
'!. H. Arendt. Macht und Ge~vaiL Piper Verlag. Miiochen. 1980. p. 4 . 
J Ibid_, p. 52. 
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army are n:at.l)' Ln mm <~rm.s. If that is no longer the CID.c, 1 he ituation 
!\ut.luenly changes. Where commands arc no Iunger obeyed, means of co-
ercion are senseless. Wll~:n speaking of "obedience", wbeo one decitles 
whether to nht.:y or not, the correlntion conunand-()hcdienoe is totally ir-
relevant. Namely, the am;wer to this question depends solely upon tlu: 
general "opiniou" (Meinung) and o n the number of those who more or 
les!\ share rhis "opinion". lt becomes evident lhat everything depends on 
the power behind the mjght".4 
These tlblinctions point ro Lhe reasons of the tli'\integr,uion of Lhe 
t:ummunist systems of coercion. ln the beginning they perhaps enjoyed the 
uppon of their citiLcn" Inn gradually, despite the colossal mcun" of co-
ercion they had armed themselves with, t11ey could not urvive, since in 
time the tru t and tlle consent of their citizen for such a type of com-
munalism grudually dissolved. Eventually this huge might collapsed with a 
bang, and ncithcr guns nor tanks could have pn:ventcd that. The systems 
of coercion become self-destructive in the ir perfection. The collapse of th~..: 
commurust systems of co~..:n:ion was the consequence of the governments' 
105.5 of power, re ·ulting from their citizens' los,." uf trust. 
Accordingly, in his essay ou Evolutionar}' umversals in soci'ely ( 19tH), 
Parsons asserts that modem capitalism has losi( the intcn ity of open class 
struggle. By means of social stratification it gave legitimacy to th~ ilispar-
it} in salaries based on lb.: functional allocation of social task.\; hy means 
of monetary economy it unraveled local social tit:!\ and established an ex-
tensive network of social relationsrups. Besides, it 1.1> exceptionally impor-
lllnt that modern capitalism t:reatcd <1 uruversalist system of right s, the 
major creation nf modern nge. And finally, capitalism created "democratic 
associations" by means of which it was possible to give legitimacy tu cer-
tain political decisions. According to Parsons these nrc thc ·'evolutionary 
uruversal" whnsc creation en:\bled modern capitalism to survive. Of course, 
societies incapable of innovation bccum~ ossified and are con t:4uently 
doomed. Thi fact prompted Parsons tO conclude that tota.lit<•rian commu-
nist organ.Uation!> would not be able to embmcc democracy and its politi-
cal and integrational capacities. 
" My progno is'', he; write , .. is that the communist urg-.miz<uions of the 
society will prove unstable, will not adapt Lo electoral democracy and will 
not create a pluralist party l>ystem, bu t wiJJ relapse into politically less ef-
fective forms of Mg;wization. This assertion relies, not i.n the least, on 
the fad 1 hat comrourust parties everywhere emphasized the necessity for 
their subjects to be educutcd for the new society. l.J1 time, iL'\ legitimacy 
will surely be undermined if party leaderships a rc not willmg to trust the 
people that they a llegedly educated. Tu Lru'>t people implies handing over 
to them a part of politic.tl responsibiJiry. Tillis can only mean lhat Lhe 
4 Ibid., p. 64. 
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monolithic and unifieu party must fm;llly give up on its monopoly of po-
litie<ll n:sponsibili ty" (Parsons, op. cit.). 
The breakdown uf party monolithism brought about the we<~kcning of 
the: party's integra tiona! force in the society which maa k~d the bt:ginning 
of rhc tlisintegrational proce.s'>e~ which it t.."'u ld nor check. 
The similar prognoses, despite his critici!o.m of Parsons, were mm.le 
rei at ivcly early by Rolf Dahrcmlorf in his theory of social conflicts. lie 
claims that social contlicts make the living core of a society, whilc peace 
represents its death. Conilicts are not dysfunctional but always give rise to 
the new and the better. It L pu.>l>ihlc to clas. ify soci<tl systems according 
to wbc.ther they allow and encourage social t:onfficts and how they chan-
nel them. Consequent!). in to talitarian system (such as Stalinism), which 
suppre.!·s social conflicts, the conflict~ nevertheless come to a head. 
" ln modern totalitarian societies based on ideological state parties, the 
risk is, primarily from the point of view of the rulers, that the only sa nc-
tioned orgu nization, the state party it !'i~.: l f, will become the source of the 
oppositional developments nnd revolutionary conllicts''. This claim might 
have been tested on numeruu!o. Eastern bloc state p<trticl>. In a strictly 
centrali t '>)"lent, '·mediatory" alliance" aml in. titutions which cou ld mobi-
lize the potential for conflicts. channel them and creatively use them, are 
lacking. 
My thesis iN that on ly in the light of the collapse of socialism can we 
adequately assess the prosp ects nnd the dangers of natimw)jsm. Nationalist 
movements. though genuinely hu1o.Lilc towa1·ds communist dictator!o.hips, are 
in danger lu m.lopL many elements of the 'i<tme system. That is why the 
breakup of the Eastern blue and the ascent of nationali '>m hould be das-
CU'>!.ed joinlly. 
2. 
The a:tU\CS of the breakup of the E<tslcm bloc could have been furc-
told. This process went hand in band wilb the boom uf nationalism. The 
trend bas provoked major conflicts not only in the newly hberatcd coun-
tries: in Wc!o.Lcm democracies nationalism halo. a lso become a contentiou" 
issue. lt is only tou natural that nationalist tendencies have taken root in 
posLcommunist countries. It is generally known that the ole inlc!:,rrational 
fo rce in communist countries was the party, which had its own state, i.e. 
its army, its courts ancJ its m~.;dia. This completely destwycd the civic cul-
ture of participation in political life liS well as any individua l entreprenur-
sb.ip in economy. When Yugoslavia was on its lao;t leg.-., it used to be said 
Lltat its sole integrational force was the Federal Army: the -;ituation was 
imilar in other communist counrries. Hannah Arendt has taught us that 
political power cannot be based on guns. The nationalist movements have 
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proved remarkably powerful in the nt:\\< ly created cin:um lances, which re-
quire), thctm~lical explanation 
'l h~ maJOr incentiVe for a comprehensive a M!. !>mcnt uf modem na-
tionalism came from F.ngli.,h--;pc:tl..ing countries: Britain, U A and Canada. 
In c~mada one periodical de\-'Oted only to the: problem of nationalism ~ 
published. 
In Germany, p:Jrtic.:nl:uly afte r irs ullifkation, a vehement debate has 
been going on about the si~uficance and the role of nation and national-
ISm: on the one band, nationali-.m il> defined as an ideology of nat ional 
intolerance :md aggressiveness. and on the other. the imponance of the 
nation is stressed, for the time bei11g central for th~; homugcninttiun nf 
the community. the founda tion of 1 he democratic political constitunon and 
it~ fund inning. The debates range from the bard-core untinutionalism of 
Peter O lo tz or Dieter Oberndo1f to the c:xtn:me naliorwlism llf Arnulf 
Baring, Michael Wnlfsohn nr F.rnsl Nolte. These debates nre o f particu lar 
i nf ~.; res l to 11'> since we are under the sway of German cultura l sph~!rc. 
T he role of the nation nml na tionalism will be o utlined in seve.ral 
steps: first, the spir itual and historica l foundations of modern political 
communities will be ddined (a): this will be followed hy th ~.; enumeration 
of the centrifugal and centripeta l force.-. of modem sociely (b); and, fi-
oa1Jy, the notion of nation and nationali m will be defined. 
(a) Which is the :.piriwal and hi'>toricaf position of the modern 
pa!Jiic::JI commumty? 
1 hey are secularized communitic~ within which ind~~duals have to 
shape tht:ir commumtl life through their actions and the use of their rea-
..,on. Thi process in its essence "removes magic from the world~ and en-
ables a fuU development of men'l> creative powers. The secularization o f 
the world is the dt:nouement of modem poliricaJ conec::ptions of lhe last 
remnants of Christian thought. The new motto is: " Have courHgc to use 
your own inte llect" (Kant). Penple mu-;t get out of their adolescence, for 
which they ar~.; alone to hl<tme. Adolescence is the inability to use our in-
te llect without somebody else's he lp. Who would not reco~:,rni7e these 
words as the parting words of ~mother period, c:.11Jed enlightenment! 
Benedict Anderson, the authority on na tionalism, suggests tha t the his-
tory of na tions is possible only after the three traditional concepts have 
been done away with: first, lh<tf lhe access to ontl10logical truth is possi-
ble on ly via <1 certain language; second, the concept Lha t a society is tt 
natura lly formed community uncle!' the rule of a domimuing center i.e. a 
monarch; a nd third, co ·mology and history have to be separated. This 
means tha t the primordial uniry of the worlll and people has disap-
9 
pearcd.> The project of modernity exists in the definitivl! ··secularization of 
the world'' and is developrng within the immanence of the reason. This 
proje<.1 put.-. people into a completely new siruntiom. They have tu sustain 
themselves on their ow11 and from within themselvt:s. This required a to-
tally new interpretation of buth the individual mor:ll living aml the com-
munal living. Entirely new conc.epls of humru1 society emerged which havt: 
proved efficient up to present day. 
In this joyous celebration of rcnMm and the human c,apacity fur sur-
\ivaJ we 01n hear rumblings of entirely different hmor: Burk. TocqueviJJe 
and He1degger and ogdin. just to mention a few. 
The slaning point of I Leidegger'" famous interpretauon of motlcm 
metaphystcs is ' 'that thinking, in its new place, h.a-. fmm the start been 
dt:tcm1ined by the superiority of con!-ciousness and, consequently. tht: su-
periority of humans".6 The fmal stage: of that prm:e~ he sees in Marxism: 
"Namely, Marxism grvus pn;cedeoce to production: the ·ocial pmuuction of 
-;uciety (society produces itself) and tht: self-production of people a,o.; social 
beings. Au:oru ing to hjs opinion, Marxism rcprt:stmts today's thinkin~ since 
in it th~ principle uf :-.elf-constitution ot people anti ·ociety rule". And 
then H eidegger pronounces his jmJ!,rrrlt:lll on the \\'hole process: .. The self-
preservation uf people poses the danger of o.;df-dc!-truction". This lS fol-
lowed by the concltL-.inn: "With Marx. the state of nltimale nihilism was 
reached·' .II 
If we read this sentence politic-illl)', "it mean:-. thar politics has been 
turned into a way of :-.clf-preservation'-9· This has. as a m<lllcr of fact, 
-.hap.::d modern way ot thinking. 
Another thcorelid~111 who had some interest in po li tic." wus Eric Voge-
lin. ln his book, The NtJw Sc:ieuct: af PoJitics, he o rrived at an apocalyptic 
and fascinntiJlg diagnosis. According In him, the root of all eviJs lies in 
the triumph of the reason, in the realization of lht: ideals of tJ1e enlight· 
enment. The evil of mudcmity is caJJed gnosis: Stalin and H itll:r w.::n: the 
extreme variants of the revolt again-;t God and religion. The disregard for 
the revelation hurled people into the :~byss of the l(ltalitarian ruJe. Mass 
movements are Jed by the ideologues of the twentieth century. The prc-
cipitou~ uesceot of modernity into totalitariani. m:-. is the re ult of the 
twenrietb century. Yugelio goes on to claim: "The maSJ>;vent:. s of this his-
~ B. Anderson. Nacija: Z<1IJ1isljen,7 zajcdnica, Zugreb, 1990. p. 4J. 
C> M . l lcidegger. Vic:r Sc:minurr:. V. KJostennllDJ1, Frankfur!/M., 19T7. p. 125. 
7 [bid.. p. J 25. 
8 fhid., p. 12.5; idem, Holzwege, p. 201 , Scinsfrngc! J955. NJeczscbe 1. 11, l9fiL 
9 lbid., p. 131. 
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torical phenomenon must be given much thought to, if we want to under-
s1and the massiveness of I he gnostic tendencies of uur time" 10 
Vogelin thinks that the. lack of belief led to vicious and predatory be-
haviour in concn:Lc social siLuaLinu.-;. ln Lilt: postscript of his last letter to 
Alfred Scbi.itz of January lst, 1953, Vogelin sets forth (referring to Hei-
degger) an extreme thesis: "Heidegger, who in his later works parted ways 
wilh his beginnings in existenlial philosophy and romanticism, furrnulales 
this problem extremely uneompromisingly: 'Who does not believe, cannot 
think'" .11 
From the standpoint of modernity and its spiritual and historical posi-
tion, there is an ambivalent view of nationalism. On the one hand it is 
considered a restriction imposed on the self-cnnstiLuling mankiml while on 
the other it is considered a collective subject, i.e. the cumulative power of 
unified individuals. 
Let us put this ambivalence aside for the time being. 
(b) Modemity is defiued by two opposi.JJg forces: one:: is centn'fugui 
ami the other ce::ntripel;J/. 
The centrifugal or emaocipatory tendency centers round the concept of 
a ''civil society" (Hegel). "ln a civil society", write.~ Hegel, "everyhody is a 
purpose to themselves, everything else is nothing to them" (§ 182). How-
ever, that "selfish purpose in its realization is conditioned by universality" 
which "establishes a system of comprehensive inlerdependence" (~ 183). 
Hegel ca lls this system the external state, the state of necessity and intel-
lect. This, basically work-related interdependence releases us from tht:: tics 
based on ori~,rin , family, religion and nation. Only after such an emancipa-
tion from individual drc.umstances are we able to act as human bein&rs. 
Only then can people be themselves, only then can the universal t::xchange 
of goods occur. A worker hewmes the symbol of the equality of people 
and the measure of political constitution. This process is never-end ing and 
tends to embrace the entire society and the whole world. The world snci· 
ely is possible solely on such a base. However, it has been proved that 
the self-constitution of the working process as the sole basis for the uni-
versal unification of people is nul possible. Th is universa (jty, founded on 
private interest, cannot bring about common purpose. Relations among 
people petrify since they are reduced to the process of balancing private 
interests. The erosion of solidarity ensues; it cannot. he recompensed with 
the welfare state, insurance state or the night guardian state. 
lO Merklu, 1952. 
1'1 Eric Vogelin, i\l.fred Schutz, Leo Strauss, Arou Gutwitsch, Bdefwechsel 
iiber "Die oeue WL~sem:ch,?fr der Politi/.."', Freihnrg, 195~ , p. 98. 
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Although, as Dahrendorf say , " the indusrrial production forces are no 
longer withm the realm of a nalioual state, the power of the political 
'hnukl not be underestimated". ll Th~ function-; uf t.-crtain deeper ties can 
today to a la~l! extent he taken over by the national state. There iJ. 
-.imply a limit to the possibilitie.!- of mnlticulwral assimilation. ln this a 
-;trong umhivaleuce is also di play~d: on the one hand th~ inten.lept:udence 
is gairung momentum, and un the other. our rights, our freedom and the 
mutual personal recognttion can be a ttained only within a maJJer area. 
1\nd that area is still the national stare . So. even if the world ·talc were 
posstble , it need not tu: rcaliLcd in order to preserve the variety of hu-
manity. 
The tendt:m:y of emancipation can be considered as a big ·uccess fnr 
modern society onJy whe n not din:cLcLI against the spiritua l forces that 
lwv~.; rmH.le it possible. ln other words, centriflJgt~l fmccs nt<lke sense un-
less they represent an ohstaclt: for the retum of people to their historical 
existence. 
(c) 111e c.oncept of mtliou uutl twliouality 
1 accept the d ivision into nation and natiomtlity which wa' daborated 
by Bernhart.! Peters. H e defines nation "as a form o f a symbolic nr 
imagmary community which doc.-. nnl ne.cessarily coincide! with the form of 
collective identity, in which members of modern socie tie' arc regarded as 
citizen i.e . a" mcmbcn. of a legal and poll tical system .. _..3 t· rom this he 
draws the foiJowing conclusion: ·• ations in thilo. scu:c are communities 
that om refer to one, already established organization''. P lt is a form of 
collective adentity which was e ither created by a state or it emerged 
within a state. 
The mmlt:m state bas shaped political unity in a specific manner, pur 
a lid on religious civil war., ralionalizt:tl relationships. cau ed changes in 
economic, social and cultu ra l medieval institution . It g<Jvc more perma-
nence, solidity and spiritual cohesion to politic.tl uni ties. With the forma-
tion of national borders there emcr!,~ the nationaJ will as n strong politi-
cal bond, the cente r (i.e. the capital). the seat of the supreme authority 
is furmcd, the state becomes the sole agency with the legitimate right of 
coercion, the function of law chung~o;s, soverciguty becomes the central fen-
tun: of the st ate, modern administration is formed and the public is t..Tc-
ated. Most significan tly, th~ emergence of national opinio n may be attrib-
uted to the state. The c.oncept of nation, a eonscqul!n~t.: of the function-
t2 R. Dnhrendorf, Merkur, 1994, I left 9(10. pp. 757-765. 
13 11. l'eLers, Die fntcgrotivn wuut:mer Gesellscbaften, Suhrkamp, FrankfurtTM .. 
1993, p. 192. 
JJ lbid., p. 193. 
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ing statehood, was mentioned tor the first time in the works of Leihniu 
and Fene lon. lt is no wonu~r that the concept of nation and nationaUty 
first made a breakthrough in France, the first modern state in hunum his-
tmy, and that the first guru of nationalism was J. J . Rousseau. The con-
cepts of stale ami nation, slalehuou anu n<LtionaJity are inseparable. The 
latest events have shown that the most st:1ble political unities are those in 
whjch the state a11d the nation coincide. 
However, according to Pe ters, "nationa liHes arc sueh t.;ommunilies or 
movements that are only beginning to voice their demands for an inde-
pendent political status - whether in the form of an independent state 
or a special form of po litical autonomy. The leg<~l fxamework fur this may 
already exist or it is established when the need arises. The grounds for 
such a collective demand anu Lhc Wllt!dive iucnlification of a particular 
community or a movement is most often some sort of ethnic identitica-
tion".15 
So, in this case natiomtlism precedes the state and the statehood and 
occurs as a reversal of the historic process and is analogous to simjJar 
processes that happened iJl the states which have a!J·eady achieved state-
hood and nlitionhood. Here we Hre not cle<lling with nations-latecomers 
but more with states-latecomers that have. due. to a variety of reasons, 
fa iled to come into existence. 
Modern nationalism is two-faced: on the one hand, it is a result of 
state functioning, and on the other it can foster the crea tion of a state 
or autonomy of an etJutieity. WltClt uiseussing nation, two concep ts arc 
most often used. One is the so called German concept of natio n bnsed 
on the origin and the language (1\bstummung und Sprache), according to 
which a nation is preordained rl!gardless of whether its members want it 
or not. An individual is predestined to belong to a nation, regardless o f 
their will, and can only function from it. The other is the French concept 
of nation which is based on indiviuual conse.nt Lo helong to a nation. 
That concept of nationality includes onJy those individuals that want to 
belong to a nationality. As Renan so aptly said: "L'existence d' une nation 
est un plebiscite de taus Jes jours". 
Regardless of this divis ion, nation and nationality are highly dependent 
on a state: where the state based on law preceded national homogeniza-
tion <t high debrree of univerS<tlity was achieved which served as a bu lwark 
against the excesses of nationalism. Where there was no sta te based on 
law, nationalist movements turned into vicinus dict<tlorships. 
In today's complex societies a plethora of factors influence the stability 
of a system. The creation of legal structures was the requisite ba:~e fo r 
Lhe mouem state. The national principle limits the number of citizens as 
ts Perers, ibid., p. 193. 
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well as rhe univers<~lity of muc.lt:m m1lUru\ lnw. The merging ot tht: prin-
ciples of the tate based on law and the nationa l sta te occurr~d immedi-
ately after the collapse of momm.:hics. In fuel, the state was able to gen-
erate universal mobilization only o n the basis on natkma l cc.msuliua tion. 
Nation, as the fo undation of democrucy, has insofa r played the key ro le. 
Namely, it crea tes homngeneity aml so•litb1rity essentia l fo r the functioning 
of democracy. De.mocr:wies evolve within a state with the na tion :1s the 
most powt:rful source of generat ing solidtuity, both horizonta l and vutica l. 
Today not a single st<1 te can do wit hou t nHiinnality as the founuation of 
homogenization but different states have different needs regarding 1 he 
mohilization of the •mtiunal princjplt:. My opinion is that nation IS to play 
a major role in the creation of a community\. common purpo. t: for <I 
long time to come. 
3. 
After the {.lt:mi c of the communi t party in Croatia. M tionalism 
proved irs met11~ in the homogenization uf people. Only those parties that 
made use of nationalist t-lements h<ld some political chance. The aggrc.:l>-
~ion of Serbin fortified this national homogeneity wbkh thus became an 
all-embracing b~tse for the country', dl:fl:n!.c;. From this high degree of 
national homogeneity horizontal and vcnic;tl solidarity evolved, hut thil> 
cbbetl away a~ the aggression subsided. Although th~ structure of the na-
tionaJ state developed ntpidly, the development of tiJt: slate based on law 
bas been rnther slow. There are reasons tor that: 
I. The cntin.: society has bt:en strongJy politically constituted. The; po-
litical constitution has brought about a polariza tion into friend. and ene-
mies which has created tension in the society. l o the communist system 
only the Ca tho lic chmch was o utsiuc the system. AU other spheres of life 
were under the party's thumb. 
Aft~: r tht: fall of communism nod the ascent of nationalism. a new 
party took over tbe role of the slatc p<trty. Because of such close ties 
between the parry and lbe state, a ll the spheres of life have ht.:cll trying 
to get in line with this tendency. Instead of the autonomy of various 
spheres and the differentiation of complex -.ucietic · 11ew dependencies 
arose. 
2. The process of transition from the !\Y!\Icnt of social to private own-
ership has Ia ted much too long and has g.ven rise ro a ort of criminali-
zation of lhc -.clCicty. The leading polit ical forces are in a posmon to 
manipulate people and resources. The entirt: indu-;trial sphere once again 
depenill un politics. Tllis holds true for education. science and judici<try m. 
well 
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3. Th~re is, a.-. hdore, the danger of opportunism :-~mong inte llectuals. 
T he chronjc existentia l insecurity has thwarted the creation of tbe e lites 
who would not only want to serve but would, and could, lead. 
4. This s ituation has been overshadowed by the war which has been 
going on in Croatia o r which has, at least, been a constant threat.. This 
has bee::n an obstacle in Lht: process of the uemncratizatinn, a lthough th is 
should not prompt us to jump to a conclusion tha t authoritarian govern-
ments a re stronger than democratic as is sometimes claimed. 
5. The situation in Croatia depends on the leading political and inte l-
lectua l establishments of the West. However, so far their efforts have 
amnuntet.l to no mnrc lhan fumbl ing and !,'TOping in the t.lark. The ir m-
clecisiveness has only aggravated tbe process of the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia and the creation of the new states. 
We mig ht conducle that nationalism bas played a significant ro le in the 
destruction of communist dictatorships. However, without a continuous de-
velopment of legal and sociaJ instruments there is tbe risk nf s lipping 
hack into an Huthoritarian o r totalitarian mle. 
Tramd:-~ted by 
Ho.iica Ja.kmdev 
